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Commodity markets are designed to enhance the flow of commodities 
and reduce risks for both buyers and sellers.  Unfortunately, these markets 
can be open to market manipulation, with economic actors functioning to 
distort markets and gain profits from engaging in activities that distort 
prices.  This issue has increased in prominence over the last several years 
due to concerns about the manipulation of various energy markets.  
 
The nature of market manipulation, the role of the primary enforcer of 
such rules––the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and its 
recent decision in DiPlacido are reviewed in this paper.  The CFTC 
decision demonstrates its deficient understanding of both manipulation 
law and the actual workings of commodity markets.  In particular, the 
CFTC appears to have no ability to discern the difference between pro-
competitive trading according to supply-and-demand forces, and the 
market manipulation that destroys markets.  This raises significant 
questions about whether the CFTC, the designated expert agency in this 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Commodity markets are designed to enhance the flow of commodities and reduce 
risks for both buyers and sellers.  Unfortunately, these markets can be open to market 
manipulation, with economic actors functioning to distort markets and gain profits from 
engaging in activities that distort prices.   
 
Distinguishing and combating market manipulation is a difficult, perhaps 
nearly impossible, task.  The nature of market manipulation, the role of the 
primary enforcer of such rules––the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), and its recent decision in DiPlacido
1 are reviewed in this paper.  The 
CFTC decision demonstrates its deficient understanding of both manipulation law 
and the actual workings of commodity markets.  In particular, it appears to have 
no ability to discern the difference between pro-competitive trading according to 
supply-and-demand forces, and the market manipulation that destroys markets.  
This raises significant questions about whether the CFTC, the designated expert 
agency in this area, can be trusted to protect commodity markets from 
manipulation. 
 
Section II presents the basics of market manipulation and a discussion of recent 
CFTC actions in this area.  Section III describes a different variety of manipulation, index 
manipulation, which was at issue in DiPlacido. Section IV presents the actors and events 
in the litigation. Section V explains the deeply flawed legal standard laid out by the 
CFTC and the elements missing in that standard.  Section VI outlines the main arguments 
of both the plaintiff, the Division of Enforcement (DOE) of the CFTC, and the defendant 
DiPlacido.  Section VII presents the crucial issues in the case of “violating offers.” 
Section VIII details the events of after-hours trading on July 27, 1998 that shed light on 
the relevant events in the case. Section IX presents some final words from the 
participants in the case, while Section X contains concluding thoughts.  
 
 
II.  An Introduction to Market Manipulation 
A.  The Basics of Market Manipulation 
 
Commodity futures markets exist in many commodities, such as agricultural 
products, oil, natural gas, and now electricity.  In these markets buyers and sellers trade 
the right to deliver a specified amount of a good at a specified spot at a specified time.   
 
Contracts are standardized and registered with the relevant exchange.  The 
exchange takes responsibility for enforcing contractual provisions.  As a result, one party 
to the transaction is generally indifferent to the identity of the other party.  Thus, the 
                                                 
1 In the Matter of Anthony J. Diplacido, Opinion and Order, CFTC Docket No 01-23, 
November 5, 2008. 
 
  1rights imbedded in futures contracts are tradable across all parties in the market.  Futures 
markets exist to reduce the risk of market participants or to increase their liquidity.    
 
Parties taking a position to buy a commodity at a certain time are referred to as 
“longs.”  Parties promising to deliver the commodity are referred to as “shorts.”  
Generally, the number of contracts traded is many times the number of contracts actually 
delivered.  This generates the possibility of a “squeeze” or “corner.”  A corner is said to 
occur when a party buys a large number of long positions and insists upon delivery.  This 
may catch the shorts unaware, as they were expecting to simply cash out their positions 
(as usually happens), rather than actually deliver the product.  In such circumstances, the 
shorts are willing to pay extra to get out of their contracts, rather than pay the costs of 
unexpected delivery.  The party undertaking the corner exercises market power by buying 
a large fraction of the long position. 
   
Any market manipulator has the challenge of unloading his excess position 
without taking too large a loss.  The manipulator is now extremely long (or short) in the 
underlying commodity and must “bury the body” by flatting out their position.
2  For 
example, assume that a manipulator of the corn market conducts a squeeze by buying a 
great deal of the corn available for delivery.  He may well be able to “squeeze” futures 
contract holders, but then he must offload his excess corn.  This corn will likely be sold 
soon after the relevant manipulation.  Selling so much corn is likely to decrease the price 
of corn, reducing the manipulator’s profits. 
 
As Fischel and Ross point out,
3 it can become very difficult for a manipulator to 
profit unless the gains earned by offsetting their futures positions with the shorts exceed 
the losses sustained while burying the body.  In addition, it should be relatively easy for a 
legal authority to spot the manipulator engaged in such strategies by observing their 
excess trading.  Indeed, Pirrong asserts that “the burying-the-body effect is characteristic 
of manipulation. The documentation of such an effect makes it possible to distinguish 
manipulations from competitive outcomes.”
4  
  
                                                 
2 See Pirrong, Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery Process, The 
Journal of Business, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 335-369. 
3 Fischel and Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial Markets, 105 
Harvard L. Rev. 503, 542 (1991). 
4 Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market 
Manipulation, 38 J. Law & Econ. 141,145 (1995). 
  2B. The Interest in Market Manipulation 
 
The presence of commodity markets has always been attended by market 
manipulation.  Over the last 130 years, there have been cases in copper, coffee, silver, 
soybeans, egg, grain, and a variety of other products.
5 
  
Market manipulation has gained great attention over the last 10 years, in large part 
due to the meltdown of the California electricity market in 2000–2001.
6  In that market, a 
variety of firms (most famously ENRON) were accused of taking advantage of that 
state’s poorly designed market to extract profits through manipulation.  In wake of the 
California debacle, both the CFTC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have 
taken a variety of actions against alleged manipulators.  
 
From 2001–2008, the CFTC brought 41 manipulation cases involving energy 
markets.  Most of these cases involved the false reporting of trading prices and volumes, 
with settled fines ranging from $2 to $35 million.  Though the complaints about the 
respondents’ motives and strategies are not clear, a possible theory is that the false 
reporting was designed to alter index prices to the respondent’s benefit.  For example, the 
respondent may have owned options whose settlement price was based on reported 
trading prices.  Unfortunately, in many of its orders, the Commission was not clear about 
which economic theory it was applying. 
 
The CFTC has also brought several more traditional manipulation cases, in which 
parties traded assets to affect various asset prices.  In March 2002, the CFTC settled a 
manipulation case in which ENRON was accused of “excess purchases” of natural gas at 
the Henry Hub delivery point.  ENRON agreed to pay $35 million in fines.
7  Though 
some type of manipulation theory may be imagined in this case, the Commission did not 
actually outline a theory of ENRON’s economic motivations in its order. 
 
In June 2006, the CFTC filed a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois against BP Petroleum, alleging that BP manipulated 
the price of February 2004 TET physical propane by, among other things, cornering the 
market for February 2004 TET physical propane.  The CFTC also charged BP with 
attempting to manipulate the price of April 2003 TET physical propane by attempting to 
corner the April 2003 TET physical propane market.  This matter resulted in a settlement 
between the CFTC and BP in October 2007.  
                                                 
5 See, for example, Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market 
Manipulation 89:1 Michigan Law Review, 30 (1990). 
6 See, for example, Considine and Kleit, “Can Electricity Restructuring Survive? Lessons 
from California and Pennsylvania”, pages 39-62 in Electric Choices: Deregulation and 
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In July 2007, the CFTC took action against Energy Transfer Partners for using 
Hurricane Rita as a pretext for going short in natural gas futures based on an index price, 
and then selling natural gas to drive the index price down.  This would appear to be a 
good example of “index manipulation” (see next section).
8  This matter was settled in 
March 2008.  
 
In July 2007, the Commission brought a complaint alleging that, for each several 
expiry days at issue, Amaranth (a hedge fund) acquired more than 3,000 NYMEX natural 
gas futures contracts in advance of the close of the trading period, which it planned to, 
and for the most part did, sell during the close.  The complaint also alleged that 
defendants held large short natural gas financially-settled swaps positions, primarily held 
on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).  The settlement price of the ICE swaps was 
based on the NYMEX natural gas futures settlement price determined by trading done 
during the closing range on expiry day.  The complaint alleged that the defendants 
intended to lower the prices of the NYMEX natural gas futures contracts to benefit their 
larger swaps positions on ICE and elsewhere.
9 
 
In May 2008, the CFTC took the unusual step of announcing that it was in the 
middle of an investigation, six months long at that point, of the potential manipulation of 
petroleum markets.
10  Then, in a case that appears very much like DiPlacido, in July 2008 
the CFTC filed charges against Optiver for manipulating NYMEX petroleum markets.  
According to the CFTC complaint, the respondents held futures positions that were 
settled on the average closing price during a five-minute period.  To affect the closing 
price, the respondents traded during the close in a manner that ensured an increase in the 
value of their futures position.
11  
 
Concerns about high volatility in oil markets caused the U.S. Congress to pass the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), giving the Federal Trade 
Commission oversight of oil market manipulation.  At this writing the FTC is engaged in 
rulemaking on enforcement of the EISA.
12  
 
In passing EISA, Congress was conspicuous in not giving jurisdiction to the 
CFTC, the historical regulator of these markets.  Thus, in the current division of 
responsibility, the FTC has manipulation authority over wholesale petroleum markets, 
while the CFTC has jurisdiction over petroleum derivative markets. 
 




10 Mark Huffman, Feds Probing Possible Oil Market Manipulation, Consumer 
Affairs.com May 30, 2008, 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/05/gas_prices246.html. 
11 http://www.cftc.gov/newsroom/enforcementpressreleases/2008/pr5521-08.html. 
12 See http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/rules.htm 
  4  With the current interest in market manipulation, DiPlacido stands as an 
important case.  It is the only recent example of a complete litigated decision by the 
CFTC on market manipulation.  As such, it is an important window into the CFTC’s 
ability to prosecute and determine the outcome of such matters by protecting the proper 
functions of commodity markets from manipulation. 
 
 
III.    Index Manipulation 
A.  What is Index Manipulation? 
 
One important tool in risk management is options.  For example, for a certain 
price, one can buy the right (but not the obligation) to purchase a stock at a certain price.  
This is referred to as a “call option.”  Thus, an economic actor might pay $4 for the right 
to purchase a share of Microsoft stock at $20 by three months from today.  Upon 
expiration three months from today, if the price of a share of Microsoft is less than $20, 
then our actor will not exercise his call option, and gain 0.  If, however, the price of 
Microsoft stock is greater than $20, our actor can purchase the stock at a price of $20 and 
gain money (minus, of course, the $4 initial investment). 
 
It turns out, however, that actors who purchase options are generally not 
interested in actually purchasing the “underlying” (here, a share of Microsoft).  So 
options contracts are often “cash settled”––rather than purchasing a share of Microsoft 
stock, our actor simply receives the difference between the closing price of Microsoft 
stock and the “strike price” of the option (here, $20 if that difference is positive).  
Otherwise, our actor receives 0.  This makes purchasing and profiting from options much 
easier, especially for products that are difficult to take delivery in (e.g., natural gas, 
electricity). 
 
Cash settlement, however, leads to another problem.  The proper “closing” price 
is usually not very clear.  At the end of a trading day, trading can become rather hectic, 
with prices fluctuating in some range.  To address this problem, settlement prices are 
usually set up to be the average price of the commodity traded over a specific period of 
time.  For example, in DiPlacido, the settlement price was the average transaction price 
over the last two minutes of trading.  
 
Unfortunately, many commodity markets are subject to what is referred to as 
“price impacts” or “price slippage.”
13  The number of buyers and sellers available at any 
particular time in many markets is limited.  What this means is that if a purchaser wants 
to buy a large amount of the commodity in a very short period of time, the price is likely 
to “slip.”  For buyers, their actions to buy a large amount of a commodity will likely 
drive up the price of that commodity in the short run.  Similarly, a seller of large amounts 
of a commodity can drive the price down. 
 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Larry Harris, Trading and Exchanges (2003) at 72. 
  5This sets the stage for index manipulation.  Assume that our actor owns a very 
large amount of Microsoft call options with a strike price of $20.  If, in the closing 
period, the actor can drive the price of Microsoft up (assuming that the price of Microsoft 
is already above $20 and therefore “in the money”), that actor can make more money on 
his options.   
 
For example, assume that our actor has 1,000 options with a strike price of $20.  
Assume that the market price of Microsoft is $21.  Assume that if our actor purchases 
500 shares of Microsoft, his purchase will raise the price of Microsoft to $24.  (To make 
our lives easier, assume that the average cost of purchasing Microsoft is halfway between 
$21 and $24, or $22.50.)  Also assume that when the settlement period is over (say, the 
next trading day), the price of Microsoft will fall back to $21.  This is what is referred to 
above in section II, part A as “burying the body.” 
 
In this instance, without manipulation, our actor will make $21–$20, or $1 per 
option, for a total of $1,000. 
 
But with manipulation, our actor will make: 
 
Value of Options – Costs of Buying Stock During the Settlement Period + 
Revenues from Selling Stock after the Settlement Period = 
 
1000*($24-$21) – 500*$22.50 + 500*$21=  
 $3000-$11,250+10,500=$2250. 
 
In this theoretical case, our option holder could make $2,250–$1,000=$1,250 by 
manipulating the closing price for Microsoft.  Of course, such actions distort the closing 
price for all investors who rely on that price, harming the risk management value of the 
option. 
 
  A similar strategy is available for put options.  Put options give the owner the 
right, but not the obligation, to force another actor to purchase the stock at the contracted-
for strike price.  For example, our economic actor could own 1,000 put options with a 
strike price of $20, expiring on a certain date.  If the price of Microsoft is below that 
price, the options are “in the money” and valuable.  The option holder will exercise his 
option.  If, on the other hand, the price of Microsoft is above $20, the put option is out of 
the money, does not have value, and will not be exercised. 
 
  For the holder of the put option, index manipulation is simply the reverse of index 
manipulation for the holder of the call option.  Our hypothesized manipulator simply sells 
a good deal of the underlying asset, driving the price down.  The put options in the 
actor’s possession now have greater value.  Of course, the manipulator loses money 
because he is now “short” Microsoft stock.  To cover his short position, he is likely to 
have to purchase Microsoft stock in the near future––another version of “burying the 
body.”   
 
  6This theory has some important conditions that should be observable to the 
investigator.  First, the alleged manipulator must hold in-the-money call options.  Second, 
the number of futures contracts bought will generally be far less than the number of 
options owned.  Third, the manipulator may have owned many options, but few or no 
underlying futures contracts prior to the manipulation event.  Finally, the manipulation 
strategy should raise not only the price the manipulator pays for the contract, but also the 
price paid by subsequent purchasers (the “leverage” effect).  This is the theory presented 
by the Division of Enforcement in DiPlacido.  (Section V will present the defendant’s 
theory of the case.) 
 
IV.  The Diplacido Matter 
 
The case involves trading by Anthony DiPlacido on behalf of Avista Energy 
Incorporated.  Allegedly, DiPlacido and Avista, working together, manipulated the 
NYMEX contracts on electricity for the California-Oregon border (COB) and Palo 
Verde, Arizona (PV).  (The California – Oregon border and Palo Verde are the main 
electricity hubs for power imports to California.)  The alleged manipulation took place on 
five occasions in 1998––April 24, May 22, July 27, and August 25––for the COB 
contracts, and July 27 for PV contracts. 
 
As a self-regulatory agency, NYMEX brought a complaint against DiPlacido and 
Avista.  They were found to have traded “non-competitively”––that is, after exchange 
trading on a particular contract had ended for the day.  The NYMEX fined DiPlacido 
$50,000 and suspended him for two months for the non-competitive trade and false 
reporting charges (CFTC slip op., fn. 4.).  The NYMEX dismissed claims of 
manipulation.  (The NYMEX does not appear to have investigated claims of “violating 
offers,” as discussed below.)  
 
Once the NYMEX had reached its decision, the CFTC began its prosecution.  In 
August 2001, DiPlacido was charged with aiding manipulation conducted by Robert 
Kristufek, an energy trader at Avista, and William Taylor, a vice-president at Avista, for 
the same events examined by the NYME review panel.  Avista settled with the 




After conducting an oral hearing and reviewing the record created by the parties, 
an ALJ issued his Initial Decision in September 2004.  The final decision was issued in 
October 2008.  Both the ALJ and the Commission found DiPlacido liable for 
manipulating the markets in question on four of the five days in question.  In addition, the 
                                                 
14 The Commission entered into settlements with Kristufek and Taylor, on September 12, 
2002, and September 30, 2003, respectively. See In re DiPlacido, et al. (2002-2003 
Transfer Binder) Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 29,153 (CFTC Sept. 12, 2002) and In re 
Wiliam H. Taylor, (2003-2004 Transfer Binder) Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 29,594 
(CFTC Sept. 30, 2003). 
  7ALJ found DiPlacido liable for manipulation on August 25, with that ruling later 
overturned by the Commission.  
 
As an administrative agency, the CFTC is both a prosecutor and a court.  As such, 
it often gains deference from the courts due to its perceived “special competence.”
15  
Thus, it is felt (or perhaps hoped) that the CFTC, throughout its existence, has gained 
special knowledge of the circumstances in its jurisdictional area, knowledge that is not 
available to a typical court. 
 
V.  The Legal Standard Laid out by the CFTC, and the Flaws Therein 
 
A.  Introduction to the Four-Part Test 
 
According to the Commission (slip. op. 42), the Commission uses the following four-
part test in determining whether a respondent has manipulated commodity prices:
16 
 
(l) The accused had the ability to influence market prices; 
(2) The accused specifically intended to do so; 
(3) The “artificial” prices existed; and 
(4) The accused caused the artificial prices. 
  
In practice, however, this four-part test reduces to a two-part test.  Parts (2)–(4) were 
reduced to one test in the CFTC decision.  Thus, this section begins with the ability to 
influence price.  As the discussion below indicates, however, the ability to influence 
market prices is common. 
 
  B.  The Difficulties with the Ability to Influence Market Price 
 
  The Commission found (slip op. at 43-44) that because DiPlacido was trading a 
large amount of the relevant product, he had the ability to influence the market price.  
This was no doubt correct.  Such a legal test, however, is deeply problematic. 
 
The Commission could have found the problem with its market price test by 
looking no further than the NYMEX panel’s decision on DiPlacido.  NYMEX’s 
argument for not finding market manipulation was that in previous manipulation cases 
dealing largely with “squeezes” and “corners,” plaintiffs needed to show that the 
defendant had market power in the relevant market.  With a settlement price index 
manipulation case, however, the relevant economic theory implies that market power is 
not necessary.  Rather, one needs to create a “leverage” effect by using up the available 
liquidity during the settlement period.  
                                                 
15 See, for example, Elliott v. CFTC, 202 F.3d 926 (7
th Circuit, 2000). 
16 In re Cox, (1986-1987 Transfer Binder) Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 23,786 at 34,061 
(CFTC July 15, 1987); In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass 'n (1982- 1984 
Transfer Binder) Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 21,796 at 27,285 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982); 
Frey v. CFTC, 931 F .2d 1171,1175 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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  As NYMEX points out, however, abandoning the market power argument means 
a large number of market participants have the ability to create an “artificial price.”  As 
the NYMEX panel states (at 20) with reference to Lever v. Gelderman (1990-92 CCH 
Paragraph 24,980 at 37,589), “…in a market with thin trading volume the trading of any 
market participant has the ability to move or affect price; this is not necessarily market 
manipulation.”  The NYMEX decision is remarkably consistent with the discussion of 
“price impact” cited above in Harris, supra.  Thus, the legal test for manipulation of 
ability to create an artificial price becomes non-informative.   
  
  C.  Showing an Artificial Price  
 
  As discussed above, a necessary condition for showing manipulation is to 
demonstrate that the relevant market price is “artificial.”  The basic problem with this 
condition is the lack of an accepted statistical method for showing an artificial price.  
 
  A good example occurred at trial, where the DOE presented a statement from its 
expert, Professor Hendrik Bessembinder of the University of Utah.  Bessembinder 
analyzed the changes in the close price on settlement days relative to the closing price the 
day before the settlement date and the opening price the day after the settlement date.
17  
He showed that each of the settlement day closing prices were “statistically unusual” with 
respect to the previous day’s close and the next day’s opening. Bessembinder then 
asserted that this result showed that the relevant prices are artificial.  
 
The problem with Bessembinder’s analysis is that he was unable to eliminate 
other theories for why closing prices on settlement days might be unusual.  The most 
obvious theory is that Bessembinder found unusual price movements on settlement days 
because settlement days differ from other days.  Clearly, settlement days see more trading 
than other days.  In contrast, non-settlement days may have less trading and therefore 
more “stale” prices. 
 
  Given the problems with Bessembinder’s approach, one might well ask how an 
artificial price can be shown.  The answer, in a wide range of manipulation cases, is 
unclear.  In an aptly named and influential law review article, a former Chief Counsel of 
the CFTC’s Enforcement Division put the issue this way:
18  
 
Each type of manipulation, whether market power, rumor, or rigged 
trading practice, involves a common goal. The trader is seeking to create 
an artificial price by which he will profit. But here lies the rub: it is 
virtually impossible to determine what constitutes an artificial price. Prices 
fluctuate constantly in the futures markets. Indeed, futures contracts are 
selected for trading on commodities that have volatile prices. There is, 
                                                 
17 It would appear that each underlying contract market stayed open one day after the 
close of the relevant options market. 
18 J.W. Marham, “Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices -- The Unprosecutable 
Crime,” 8 Yale J. on Reg. 281, 284 (1991).   
  9therefore, no level of price that can be said to be a typical benchmark, non-
artificial or "true" price. Instead, market conditions, which vary daily, or 
even by the minute, will determine the actual economic price of the 
commodity. Consequently, the determination of the "true" economic price 
will turn on an after-the-fact economic analysis of the price a willing 
buyer and a willing seller would have paid in the absence of the 
manipulation. But this economic analysis is so complicated and affected 
by so many factors that it is often impossible to determine what the "true" 
price was. 
  
In other words, prices fluctuate for all types of reasons that are very difficult to 
separate out in a legal proceeding.  This type of problem is why in general manipulation 
charges are very hard to sustain and why litigation often focuses on attempted 
manipulation, which does not require the showing of an artificial price. 
 
Citing many of these arguments, the CFTC (slip op. at 52) rejected the DOE and 
the ALJ’s arguments for an artificial price. The Commission, however, then moved 
smartly to devise another test for an artificial price, out of whole cloth and completely 
without precedent.  
 
D.   Henner and the CFTC’s Improper Test for Artificial Price 
 
At this point, the casual observer might think that anyone seeking to find 
DiPlacido guilty would face a logical conundrum.  The CFTC, however, was cleverer 
than that.  To show an artificial price, it dredged up an ancient case, In re Henner, 30 
Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971), a matter brought by the Commission's predecessor agency, the 
Commodity Exchange Authority, which was then a part of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.  The choice of Henner as precedent can be considered somewhat surprising.  
Indeed, as the CFTC pointed out (fn 6), “Henner has been mentioned by the Commission 
on occasion, but never exhaustively discussed in an adjudicated decision.” 
 
To understand the CFTC’s reasoning here, one has to understand the concept of 
“violating bids.”  In a trading pit, traders are required to take bids and offers in the order 
of their attractiveness.  For example, a trader selling contracts is required to take the 
lowest offers first, followed by higher offers.  Thus, if one is buying Microsoft stock in a 
trading pit, one takes the offers to sell at $21 per share before the offers to sell at $21.25, 
and so on.  Similar rules apply when a trader is selling contracts. 
 
While violating bids is apparently technically illegal, I was unable to find any 
instances of the CFTC prosecuting a trader for such violations.  Indeed, a LEXIS search 
of the terms “violating offers” and “violating bids” revealed no instances of those terms 
in a Federal or State judicial case involving market manipulation.  There appear to be 
three reasons for this.  First, the harm from violating bids is not obvious.  Some bids are 
temporarily overlooked, but those offers still remain on the floor and in a position to 
affect market prices.  Second, other traders can punish the bid violator by refusing to 
  10trade with them in future trades.  Third, commodity exchanges, which are self-regulatory 
organizations, can punish violators by themselves. 
 
Despite all this, and without precedent, the CFTC created a per se rule equating 
violating offers with market manipulation.  To support this, the CFTC, in quoting 
Henner, states: “It is not necessary to determine the respondent's precise motive. If he 
intentionally traded in a manner to distort the closing price, that is manipulation.” 
 
In fact, Henner is far more equivocal.  According to the decision:  
 
Considering all of the circumstances, the most likely motive for the 
respondent wanting to raise the closing price of November shell egg 
futures on June 25 the maximum amount permitted by the Exchange rules 
was to attract additional buying power, which hopefully would have 
resulted in a sustained price advance. However, it is not necessary to 
determine the respondent's precise motive. If he intentionally traded in a 
manner to distort the closing price, that is manipulation [citation omitted]. 
However, consideration of whether the respondent had a motive for 
wanting to distort the closing price is one of the circumstances to be 
considered, together with all of the facts in the case, in determining the 
respondent's intent. 
 
What the CFTC missed is that the Hearing Examiner was able to support the contention 
that Henner had deliberately increased the closing price of the commodity, by thoroughly 
showing that Henner had a strong incentive to do so.  
 
Similarly, in support of its blanket rule equating bid violation with manipulation, 
the CFTC (slip op. at 45) asserted that: “In Henner, the Judicial Officer inferred 
manipulative intent from the fact that Henner ‘purposely paid more than he would have 
had to pay’ in order to create an artificially high closing price” (citing 30 Agric. Dec. at 
1174).  In fact, what Henner stated at that point was:  
 
The only reasonable influence that can be drawn by the Judicial Officer 
from the facts is that the respondent, by his trading activities on June 25, 
1968, purposely paid more than he would have had to pay for November 
shell egg futures in order to cause the closing price on the Exchange to be 
two cents more than the previous day's settlement price. The respondent 
succeeded in creating an artificially high closing price for November shell 
egg. 
 
  Note two important distinctions.  First, the Judicial Officer stated that he drew the 
“only reasonable inference” available from his extensive analysis.  Second, the Judicial 
Officer stated that Henner paid more than he had to in order to drive up the closing price.  
Driving up the closing price was simple in the market Henner manipulated, as explained 
in part E below.  As shown in section VII, it was not so simple for DiPlacido. 
 
  11To create a rule that equates violating bids with manipulation is truly astonishing.  It 
stands counter to what the Examiner in Henner was trying to do and has no true 
precedent. 
 
E. Summarizing the Four-Part Test 
 
  At this point, the CFTC’s four-part test for manipulation can be summarized.  It is 
clear that the first three points of that test are deeply flawed. 
 
First, did the accused have the ability to influence market prices?  Yes, but many 
agents, however, have this ability.  Thus, this prong does not differentiate between agents 
and is therefore non-informative. 
  
Second, did the accused specifically intend to influence price?  Here it is unclear 
what “intended” means.  Was the accused trying to change the price, or was the accused 
trying to do something else that had the side effect of changing the prices? 
 
Third, did an “artificial” price exist?  As discussed above, there is a dearth of 
approaches for determining whether or not an “artificial” price actually occurs. 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, the CFTC’s four-part test does not allow for the 
obvious efficiency defense.  As discussed above, the purpose of commodity markets is to 
allow for hedging.  So a crucial question becomes whether or not a hedger would become 
liable under the CFTC’s test.   
 
Consider point 1): Can the hedger influence the market?  Certainly, since it has 
already been shown that a large number of parties can influence the market price.  2) Did 
the hedger intend to influence the price?  If the hedger intended to flatten out a large 
position, the hedger would certainly know that doing so would influence the market 
price.  So the answer to this question is clearly yes.  3) Did an artificial price exist?  Since 
the hedger’s actions would have changed the price, this would fit any existing meaning of 
the word “artificial” in this context.  Finally, did the hedger cause the “artificial” price?  
Again, the answer is certainly yes. 
 
Thus, the CFTC’s four-part test is deeply flawed.  Three of its prongs cannot be 
used to differentiate among firms.  Even if such differentiation could be made, the test 
still cannot differentiate between market manipulation (which the CFTC should seek to 
discourage) and hedging (which the CFTC should seek to encourage). 
 
  12F.  What is Missing from the CFTC’s Test, and the Role Outlined by Other 
Courts 
 
  What is missing from the CFTC’s list is simple – incentive.  Does the alleged 
manipulator have the incentive to manipulate price?  As discussed above, this can be 
deduced in a straightforward manner in the case of index manipulation cases by looking 
at underlying positions and where “the body was buried.” 
 
  Indeed, another great irony is that the CFTC cited a number of cases that 
discussed why the circumstances of a case, including motive, are important in a market 
manipulation proceeding. 
 
For example, the CFTC (slip. Op 41) cites the Eighth Circuit in Cargill v. Hardin, 
452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (1971):
19 
 
We think the test of manipulation must largely be a practical one if the 
purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act are to be accomplished. The 
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity 
of man. The aim must be therefore to discover whether conduct has been 
intentionally engaged in which has resulted in a price which does not 
reflect basic forces of supply and demand. 
 
It is this task of discovery that the CFTC avoided by its use of out-of-context statements 
in Henner. 
 
  Another great irony here is that the Henner decision follows completely the 
discovery process explained by other courts.  The Judicial Examiner explained quite 
carefully how Henner was long in the relevant quantity and how that position motivated 
his actions.   
 
In Henner, the defendant was 59 contracts long in egg futures (Henner at 1175).  
The settlement price was set equal to the unweighted average of the high and low prices 
during the settlement period.  Thus, the defendant could easily alter the closing price.  
According to the decision, Henner was able to manipulate the settlement price by buying 
eight contracts at the very last seconds of the egg-futures settlement period.  This action 
raised the settlement price from about 40.25 cents to 41 cents per dozen eggs (Henner at 
1180).  There was no accusation of violating bids in this matter.  Indeed, the method 
used––posting bids on a blackboard rather than using pit trading––precluded bids from 
being violated. 
 
The examiner carefully explained how Henner raised the price of the relevant 
futures to spark interest by other traders in the commodity, increasing the value of 
                                                 
19 Similarly, the Commission states (slip. Op. at 45) that “Intent may "be inferred from 
the objective facts and may, of course, be inferred by a person's actions and the totality of 
the circumstances."” (citing In re Hohenberg Brothers, (1975-1977 Transfer Binder) 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,271 at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977)). 
  13Henner’s long position.  Finally, the Judicial Examiner discussed how Henner “buried the 
body” (though not using such colorful language) by selling his excess contracts to 
another trader the next trading day. 
 
  The CFTC would be wise not only to cite Henner, but to use it as a model in the 
conduct of investigations of alleged manipulations.  It would appear that in the 37 years 
from Henner to DiPlacido, the CFTC’s analytical ability in this area has regressed. 
 
VI.  The Dueling Theories 
 
The DOE, offering the index manipulation theory described above in section III-
A.  DOE, argued that DiPlacido, abetting Avista’s desires, engaged in large-scale buying 
(and sometimes selling) of contracts to manipulate closing prices to enhance the value of 
Avista’s underlying position. 
 
Through his expert economist Professor Albert Kyle of the University of 
Maryland, the defendant offered a theory of market purchases that is designed to allow 
the relevant party to hedge or “unwind” his position.  Assume, for example, that a 
speculator is net short N contracts in his futures contract position.  She then buys N in-
the-money contract options to hedge her risk, which is of course a primary function of 
call options.  (Thus, this theory explains why the party in question holds the options to 
begin with.) 
 
  As the option nears expiration, a speculator who has hedged still has a month left 
of financial exposure in his remaining futures position.  However, her ability to hedge 
that risk is disappearing as the expiration date nears.  Recall that, unlike an option calling 
for physical delivery in the COB and PV markets, the speculator receives cash for her 
option position.  Thus, the expiration marks the expiration of the speculator’s hedging 
ability. Therefore, the speculator may want to exit (perhaps) her entire position. 
 
  There is nothing economically unusual about the defendant’s theory.  Indeed, it is 
simply a restatement of the basic purpose of option markets.  As Kolb and Overdahl put 
in their text on financial derivatives, “[o]ne of the most important applications of options 
is as a hedging vehicle.”
20  Thus, the existence of an option market on the relevant futures 
may imply that many parties besides Avista were using these options to hedge risk. 
 
  As with manipulation theory, hedging theory requires that the party in question 
hold in-the-money options.  In contrast to manipulation theory, however, hedging theory 
requires that the relevant party hold a previous short position in the underlying futures 
contract.  It also implies that the relevant party is purchasing a number of futures 
contracts that are similar in magnitude to the number of options it holds.  Finally, it 
implies that the purchaser of futures contracts is indeed a speculator (though it is not clear 
that this condition is useful, as anyone can be a speculator). 
 
                                                 
20 Kolb and Overdahl, Financial Derivatives (2003, 3
rd edition) 142. 
  14  The conditions for manipulation and hedging are laid out in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. 
Factual Similarities and  
Differences between Manipulation and Hedging Theories 
 
Theory Manipulation  Hedging 
Options  Holds in-the-money options  Holds in-the-money options
Previous positions in 
underlying futures contracts  
Small or none  Short equal (or near) the 
number of options held 
Number of futures contracts 
acquired 
Few in number relative to 
options position 
Similar amount to the 
number of options held 
Identity of economic actor  Unclear  Speculator needing to 
hedge 
 
  Note two important empirical differences between the theories.  Under hedging 
theory, the party in question holds a short position in the underlying futures contract 
(nearly) equal to the number of in-the-money options he holds, and he offsets most of 
those short futures contracts by going long near the time of the options’ expiration.  
These conditions do not apply to the manipulator. 
 
  Thus, there is clear factual guidance on how to distinguish these two theories, 
with the relevant evidence being perhaps relatively easy to gather.  Unfortunately, little of 
these data were presented at trial. 
 
  
  15  B.  Available Evidence, or Lack Thereof, on Avista’s Trading Strategy 
and Where Did Avista “Bury the Body”? 
 
  The trial record does contain some evidence of the futures trades made by Avista 
on the relevant settlement days.  While the data are scattered in a number of places in the 
record, they are well summarized by DOE expert Bessembinder (statement at 30). 
 
Table 2. 
Avista Trades on Market Close 





















































  Clearly, Avista’s trading was a large part of the relevant markets.  DOE makes 
this a significant part of its case, pointing out that the markets were thinly traded relative 
to Avista’s purchases.  Thus, even though DOE presents no assertion and does not show 
that Avista had market power, DOE argues that Avista had the ability to create an 
artificial price.  
 
  A showing that Avista had the ability to create an artificial price, however, is not 
particularly informative.  As discussed above (see section IV-B), once the market power 
standard is removed, any market participant can be shown to have the ability to change 
the market price.   
 
  In addition, the numbers in Table 2 are actually somewhat supportive of hedging 
theory.  Recall that the manipulation theory relies on a “leverage” or “cascade” effect, in 
which the purchases by Avista raise the price paid by other market participants.  The 
fewer “other” participants there are, the lower the leverage effect.   
                                                 
21 Evidence discussed in section VIII indicates that DiPlacido was unable to acquire 68 
contracts that he had been instructed to buy during the settlement period. 
  16 
  Knowing Avista’s contract positions prior to the relevant settlement days would 
appear to be an important element of any manipulation case. Unfortunately, despite its 
obvious relevance, there is only limited evidence in the trial record of what Avista’s 
futures and option contract position was prior to entering into trading on the relevant 
settlement days.  Most of the evidence on Avista’s strategy and position comes from the 
testimony of Avista’s Robert Kristufek.
22  Before giving his testimony Kristufek reached 
a settlement agreement with DOE on his actions in the incidents in question.  At trial, 
Kristufek was a DOE witness. 
    
  Kristufek provided little information on Avista’s actual positions. He (tr. at 255) 
indicated that on July 27 Avista was “long calls in Palo Verde and possibly COB, and 
possibly short some puts.”  However (tr. at 257), Kristufek indicated that he was unsure 
whether or not these options were in-the-money.  None of these statements contradict 
either the manipulation or hedging theories.  Later (tr. at 270), when asked about Avista’s 
net position on July 27, Kristufek stated, “I remember it being short futures.  That’s why 
we were buying them in.”  This is consistent with hedging theory, and inconsistent with 
manipulation theory.  
 
  However, when questioned about Avista’s purchasing strategy, Kristufek was 
quite clear.  When asked (tr. at 257, by DOE on direct testimony) to explain why Avista 
would be buying futures contracts, Kristufek explained:  
 
..if they were buying futures contracts during the close for the options 
contracts, I could assume that they were long in-the-money – yeah, long 
in-the-money calls or short puts, and they were buying in those hedges 
that would have been short futures contracts against those hedges. 
 
Similarly, when asked (at 258) why Avista might be selling contracts, Kristufek 
explained:  
 
if they were selling futures contracts, I would think they were probably 
unraveling their hedge, which was a long futures, and long futures hedge 
would be against a long put position or short call position. 
 
These two statements are simply descriptions of the defendant’s hedging theory.  
In addition, later in his testimony (tr. at 265) Kristufek agreed with defense counsel’s 
                                                 
22 It appears to be an open question which side had the burden of proof in showing 
Avista’s position.  As the plaintiff, DOE would seem to have had the initial burden.  
However, it also might have been within the ability of the defendant.  Recall, however, 
that Avista was not the defendant in this matter, so DiPlacido could not have supplied the 
information directly.  In addition, the fact that Kristufek testified for DOE might imply 
that Avista was cooperating with DOE.  The Defendant asserts (Reply Brief at 11) that 
this burden fell on the plaintiff.  DOE did not address this issue.  Using its per se rule, the 
CFTC was able to avoid this question. 
  17statement that the futures contract purchases on July 27 were “a hedge against your 
[Avista’s] options position.” 
 
  Kristufek also discussed his strategies on trading during closing periods.  He was 
clear that he was much more interested in having the trades he ordered quickly executed 
than in the price received by his traders. In other words, Kristufek was more interested in 
the speed of execution than the price Avista would receive for the contracts.  For 
example, in his testimony (tr. at 268), he indicated that his chief concern was simply to 
execute the ordered trades: “I remember wanting to buy all the lots, and that was what my 
concern was.” When asked (tr. at 268) by defense counsel if he was concerned about the 
settlement price, Kristufek replied, “I don’t remember having that concern.  I mean I 
remember having a concern of making sure we brought the lots in.”  Again, this 
testimony is highly consistent with hedging theory, which implies that Avista would have 
been more interested in purchasing contracts than the actual price of those contracts.  
(Similarly, DiPlacido testified (tr. at 447) that Avista’s concern was “selling all of the 
contracts.”) 
 
  I contend that Kristufek’s testimony in support of hedging theory is very 
important.  He was in a position to know Avista’s strategy.  He was testifying as a DOE 
witness (as part of his consent agreement with the CFTC), yet his testimony supported 
the defendant’s position.  Kristufek’s testimony was not contradicted in any way.  No 
other evidence is available in the trial record about Avista’s strategy.  
 
  The other available evidence on Avista’s strategy may be found in the tape-
recording of Kristufek that deals with the after-hours trading of July 27.  As discussed 
below in section IX, this recording indicated that on that date Avista was conducting a 
hedging strategy.   
 
Ironically, while there is no explicit statement of Avista’s position in the CFTC 
decision, there is a statement in the ALJ’s statement accepting Kristofek’s consent decree 
(In the Matter of: Anthony DiPlacido et. al 2002 CFTC LEXIS 119, 129 (2002).)  There, 
the ALJ stated: 
 
Avista Energy shorted August 1998 NYMEX Western U.S. electricity 
futures contracts because the manipulative scheme on the July Options 
Expiration Day involved placing a large buy order. These short positions, 
which were accumulated slowly and in a manner designed to avoid 
influencing prices in the market, would be offset by the large buy orders 
during the Closes of the NYMEX Western U.S. electricity futures 
contracts. 
 
  Amazingly enough, the ALJ claimed that Avista went long on close to enhance 
the value of its short position!  In fact, the ALJ completely confused the theory.  As 
  18indicated in Table 2, a hedger will go long in the closing period to even out its short 
position, exactly as the ALJ described.
23 
 
  If there is limited evidence on Avista’s position, there is no evidence on how 
Avista “buried the body”  As Pirrong suggests, finding such an effect should have been 
relatively straightforward.  This stands in contrast to the decision in Henner.  Given the 
magnitude of Avista’s purchases, it should not have been difficult to find the body. 
  
 
VII. Violating Offers: The Crux of the CFTC’s Decision 
 
A.  Were Bidders Violated? 
 
  The crucial episode (perhaps episodes) revolves around allegations that the 
defendant “violated offers.”  Traders in a pit are required to take standing offers 
according to their price “attractiveness.”  Thus, if a trader has a large buy order and seeks 
to accept the outstanding sell orders, he is required to take the better offers first.  If there 
is an offer to sell 10 futures contracts at, say, 98, and the next offer to sell is 20 contracts 
at 100, the buyer must take the offer at 98 before he takes the offer at 100.  (The reverse 
rule holds for sellers.)  Disobeying this rule is referred to as “violating offers.” 
 
  In this matter, the defendant is accused of violating offers during the various 
settlement periods.  Here I outline the evidence for whether or not the defendant 
intentionally violated offers.  I then move to a perhaps more interesting question:  
assuming the defendant intentionally violated offers, can it be inferred that the reason for 
such violations was to manipulate the market? 
 
  Various traders saw DiPlacido violating offers.  Among any violated traders, 
however, only trader Birbilis testified that he had been violated.  Birbilis’s testimony, 
however, may well be more supportive of hedging theory rather than of manipulation 
theory.  Birbilis testified that he offered to buy from DiPlacido on July 27 at “5-1/2.” 
(Here 5-1/2 represents a price.) According to Birbilis, DiPlacido first violated him by 
buying at “6.”  After that, however, Birbilis testified that DiPlacido bought from him at 
“5-1/2.”  (Tr. at 249-250.  Which electricity product was at issue here is unclear to me.) 
 
                                                 
23 There is one place in the Commission decision (slip op. at. 48) where the issue of 
Avista’s underlying position is noted.  According to the Commission, “Nevertheless, 
whether a respondent had a demonstrable motive may support an inference of specific 
intent, and there is evidence of Avista's motive in the record. Livingstone testified that 
Avista's trading strategy was linked to its OTC positions, and that DiPlacido told him that 
this was the case. Ex. 1, ii 8; Tr. at 125.”   
Once again, the Commission missed the point.  Under either the plaintiff’s or the 
defendant’s theory, Avista’s trading strategy is linked to its underlying positions.  But 
what is dispositive here is whether the underlying positions support the manipulation or 
hedging theories.  The Commission seemed completely unaware of this.  
 
  19  DiPlacido’s defense was that in a crowded pit, he could not observe a number of 
offers and thus made trades with only the traders he could reach.  This argument is 
consistent with DiPlacido first “violating” Birbilis, and then going back and picking up 
Birbilis’s offer.  In support of DiPlacido’s contention that the pit was crowded, trader 
McHugh (tr. at 197) indicated that the pit was noisy and had an unusual number of people 
in it on July 27; Livingstone said something similar in his statement.  Trader BWC 
(identified by his trading name) told the NYMEX panel that on July 27 there was 
“pandemonium” in the NYMEX ring.  Similarly, trader JONM testified to the NYMEX 
panel that the trading ring was “chaotic” (NYMEX decision at 10).  This supports 
DiPlacido’s position.  In addition, Birbilis (tr. at 247) indicated that on July 27, a 
NYMEX floor committee member was there but no report was made.  Indeed, lack of 
NYMEX compliance interest in this event might imply nothing unusual was occurring. 
 
  On the other hand, Livingstone (statement at 10) indicated that he heard 
DiPlacido say he was violating offers on May 22.  In addition, McCann (tr. at 224) stated 
that “brokers were screaming at him [DiPlacido]” on July 27 because DiPlacido was 
violating offers. 
 
In what might be seen as the crucial piece of evidence about whether DiPlacido 
intentionally violated offers, the CFTC asserted that DiPlacido was caught on tape after 
trading had closed on May 22 saying that he had violated offers on that day.  But this 
conclusion is not all that clear.  The statement in question from DiPlacido was: “whatever 
bid they gave me, ‘cause they were bidding for three’s and two’s, I offered right through 
them.” Certainly this statement could be interpreted as implying that DiPlacido ignored 
the offers of the “three’s and two’s.”  But DiPlacido offered another interpretation of this 
statement at trial (tr. at 462), when he asserted that: “I mean that I hit every bid that was 
there, and then offered at 20 with these other guys, sold right through them.”  Thus, 
DiPlacido asserted that he drove the price right through the “three’s and two” and kept on 
going, accepting the higher offers as well. 
 
  B.  Why Violate Offers? 
 
I can offer no guidance on the true meaning of DiPlacido’s statement of May 22, 
as it is consistent with both the plaintiff and the defense theories of the case.  I will, 
however, discuss what may have motivated the offer-violating behavior, if it did indeed 
occur. 
 
  According to the CFTC (slip op at 48), “[b]idding at higher than prevailing prices 
or offering at lower than prevailing prices self-evidently maximizes price impact in 
derogation of that duty.”  The CFTC presented no further analysis of the impact of 
bidding violations.  The Commission, however, failed to note that the index mechanism 
in DiPlacido was far different than the one in Henner.  In Henner, the close price could 
be changed by simply making the maximum price for the day.  In DiPlacido, where the 
close price was the average of many trades, changing the closing price was far more 
difficult. 
 
  20  The perhaps obvious theory is that the lower bids (and the higher asks) were 
ignored in order to raise the settlement price.  If this was somehow done to generate a 
“leverage” or “information” effect, in which buyers were induced to revise their beliefs 
about supply-and-demand conditions, or by reducing available liquidity, then it could 
well be an attempt at manipulation.  Unfortunately, DOE does not spell out a clear theory 
for this possible occurrence.
24   
 
  The justification for the basis of the Commission decision––that equating 
violating offers with manipulation––appears to be that there is no other reason for a 
trader’s decision to violate offers.  As discussed below, however, such a conclusion is 
incorrect. 
 
 In  Henner, where the settlement price was the average of simply the high and low 
prices, it was easy for Henner to manipulate the closing price.  In DiPlacido, however, 
where the close was the average of all prices during a relevant period, the ability to 
change the settlement price (and in what direction) is much harder to determine.  In 
particular, the ability to arbitrage in the pit makes it possible for a strategy of violating 
offers actually to lower the settlement price.  
 
For example, assume that a particular closing period had 100 futures contracts 
traded at an average price of $50.  Assume further that 10 of these contracts were bought 
by DiPlacido to arbitrageurs at 49.  These contracts were then “resold” to the “violated” 
traders at a price of 49. 
  
   Mathematically, the calculations start with 100 futures contracts at an average 
price of $50, for 100*50=5,000 “proportional value units.”  I take out of this total 10*48+ 
10*49= 970 value units.  This leaves 80 trades with 5,000-970=4,030 value units 
remaining. 
 
  I then construct what would have occurred had DiPlacido not violated offers.  I 
have the 80 futures contracts with 4,030 value units.  I also have DiPlacido accepting 10 
offers at 48, for 480 value units.  Together, I now have 90 futures contracts with 4,510 
value units.  The settlement price is now 4,510/90=$50.11, $0.11 above the “actual” 
closing price.  Thus, it now can be shown that violating offers can move the settlement 
price in the opposite direction from that which a manipulator would prefer, and this 
possibility is consistent with the relevant evidence. 
 
Clearly, the existence of violated offers creates the possibility that someone could 
sell to DiPlacido at a high price and then buy at a low price from the violated trader.  This 
is exactly what trader McCann indicated that he did on July 27 (Hearing tr. at 230.)  
Defense expert witness Kyle asserted in his statement (at 44) that in the NYMEX 
hearings trader JONM testified that he was able to engage in pit arbitrage on that day.  In 
                                                 
24 In addition, I cannot discern a manipulation theory that explains why DiPlacido would 
first intentionally violate Birbilis’s bid and then come back and take that same bid. 
  21addition, trader Birbilis indicated that he attempted to arbitrage the violated traders on 
July 27 (tr. at 242). 
 
  This arbitrage possibility has important consequences for the impact of violating 
offers on the settlement price.  Assume that DiPlacido’s relevant offers were below the 
final settlement price.  This is not an unreasonable assumption, as DiPlacido made it a 
central point of his defense that his average prices were better than the settlement prices 
in April and May and equal to the settlement price in July.
 25  Violating offers therefore 
create more trades below the settlement price and therefore lower the settlement price. 
 
  Violating offers can also be consistent with hedging theory.  In addition, violating 
offers because of a desire to hedge has a testable implication. 
 
  Assume that a party wishes to dispose of a number of futures contracts during the 
closing period, as the hedging theory discussed above indicates.  This is not an easy task 
for a number of reasons.  The closing period is short, and there is no legal recourse if a 
position is not unwound during the close.  Indeed, as the discussion in section VIII 
indicates, DiPlacido was unable to sell 68 PV contracts on July 27.  Given this, and the 
incentives of a hedging party on close, liquidity is quite likely going to be relatively more 
important than price.  In particular, under hedging theory, a buyer of contracts has strong 
incentives to seek out the larger sellers of contracts, even if such sellers are not offering 
the best market prices. 
 
  This theory can be tested by looking at the sizes of the offers that were violated.  
Violation of relatively small offers would be supportive of the hedging theory.  The 
limited evidence available indicates that if indeed DiPlacido was violating offers, it was 
the small offers.  Thus, for the May 22 PV close, the crucial recording presented by DOE 
and noted above had DiPlacido stating, “whatever bid they gave me, cause they were 
bidding for three’s and two’s, I offered right through them.”  Interpreting “three’s and 
two’s” as a description of the futures contract size offered by the relevant traders,
26 this 
statement (assuming one believes offers were violated) has DiPlacido explaining that he 
was offering through small offers.  For the same close, trader Caesar told Kristufek his 
offer of 2 PV futures contracts was violated (Exhibit 25, page 1). 
 
  Thus, the relevant theory implies that manipulation through violation of offers 
theory has significant difficulties.  Assuming that DiPlacido did indeed violate offers, the 
available evidence is more consistent with hedging theory.  
                                                 
25 Indeed, as the Commission noted (slip op. at 54-55), DiPlacido’s average close on PV 
in April and May was below the market average.  In the July close DiPlacido’s average 
close was equal to the market close.  If DiPlacido did violate bids, and his average close 
was below the market average close, his actions may have caused “churning” at prices 
below the market average close, thus reducing the market close.  
26 Immediately prior to the quoted statement, DiPlacido noted, “I should have more to sell 
here, these guys, they buy 2’s and 3’s.”  This statement could be interpreted as meaning 
that DiPlacido had far more to sell than the allegedly violated bidders could buy.  
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VIII.  After Hours Trading on July 27, 1998 
 
On this date, DiPlacido engaged in trading after the closing of the relevant 
market.  Such action is clearly illegal, and the defendant did not deny that he had engaged 
in such behavior. 
 
The CFTC, however (slip op. at 6), blithely concluded that DiPlacido was acting 
to manipulate the market.  It is clear, however, that if DiPlacido’s actions were market 
manipulation, it was a very unusual form of manipulation.  Further review of DiPlacido’s 
actions shows that his goal was to hedge Avista’s market positions rather than to engage 
in manipulation. 
 
Here I outline these events and explain that manipulation theory includes a 
necessary condition that seems unlikely to have been satisfied in the case.  I then pose 
two important questions about these events not answered by manipulation theory.  I posit 
theories about what did occur, both consistent with the relevant evidence and inconsistent 
with manipulation theory.  After that, I examine why Avista chose to engage in after-
hours trading and for which contracts.  This evidence is highly supportive of the hedging 
hypothesis. 
 
  The evidence indicates the following events:  After trading was completed on 
both the COB and PV futures contracts on July 27, McHugh (another NYMEX member) 
approached DiPlacido and asked if DiPlacido would be willing to purchase McHugh’s 
outstanding long position in both the COB and the PV contracts.  (McHugh had observed 
DiPlacido aggressively trading these two futures contracts during the close.)  Kristufek, 
of Avista (who was acting as DiPlacido’s principal), agreed to purchase 25 PV futures 
contracts and suggested a price to DiPlacido of $57 per mega-watt hour (MWH).  
DiPlacido noted that in his estimation (at that time) the settlement price would be higher 
than $57/MWH
27 and suggested that $58/MWH was an appropriate price.  McHugh then 
agreed to that price.  Kristufek did not agree to buy any COB futures contracts from 
McHugh. 
 
  In part A of this section, I describe the CFTC’s manipulation theory and explain 
an important infirmity in that theory.  In part B, I suggest a theoretical problem with the 
argument that the $58/MWH price agreed to implies manipulation, and present two 
hypotheses for DiPlacido’s suggestion of that price.  In part C, I present evidence of 
Kristufek’s reaction to McHugh’s offer to sell Avista both COB and PV contracts, a 
                                                 
27 DiPlacido incorrectly estimated that the settlement price would be greater than 
$57/MWH.  The settlement price turned out to be $56.81.  At trial (tr. at 473), DiPlacido 
asserted his belief that the closing price should have been 56.91, because 25 contracts that 
were reportedly traded at $55.50/MWH did not in fact trade.  DOE’s cross-examination 
(tr. at 557-9) showed that DiPlacido had made several calculation errors.  DiPlacido then 
recalculated his asserted settlement price, arriving at final settlement price of 
$56.90/MWH (tr. at 587). 
  23reaction that clearly refutes the manipulation hypothesis and supports the hedging 
hypothesis. 
 
  A. Manipulation Theory  
 
In its trial brief, DOE suggested that the behavior discussed here constituted 
manipulation, for if DiPlacido had offered and McHugh accepted the lower price of 
$57/MWH, the settlement price would have been lower and thus the alleged settlement 
price manipulation less successful.  Of course, this implication requires that McHugh 
would have been willing to accept that lower price, an assumption that does not appear to 
be borne out by the record.  
 
  It is important to note that this is not a “typical” theory of settlement price 
manipulation.  The “typical” theory, as discussed in section II, implies that by entering 
the market, the manipulator affects the price of other participants by either creating an 
artificial liquidity shortage or changing participants’ beliefs about supply-and-demand 
conditions.  Here, however, since the relevant trade is after hours, no other trades would 
be affected by the alleged settlement price manipulation.  Thus, there would be no 
“leveraging” effect, which is a crucial part of the “typical” theory.
28 
 
  Given, however, that McHugh would have taken the lower price, it is 
straightforward to calculate the resulting change in the settlement price.  A total of 342 
total PV futures contracts were traded during the close (Bessimbinder statement at 30).  
Assume that DiPlacido believed that the settlement price would be $58.00/MWH.  (The 
results here are not qualitatively different using different settlement prices.)  This means 
that the total value of these was proportional to 342*$58.00=$19,836.  Selling 25 futures 
contracts at a dollar less implies that one would subtract $25 ($1* 25 futures contracts) 
from this amount, to yield a “counterfactual proportional value” of $19,811.  Dividing 
this value by the number of futures contracts sold (342) yields an average price of $57.93.  
Thus, the alleged manipulation arguably increased the settlement price by 7 cents 
($58.00-$57.93). 
 
  Given this, what position would Avista have had to hold for this to be a profitable 
manipulation strategy?  Assuming away the costs of “burying the body” (disposing of 
excess futures contracts), this is a simple number to calculate.  Let N be Avista’s net 
position in options, equal to its option position minus its short position in futures 
contracts.  Net profits to Avista are therefore: 
 
Net Profits = (N * Change in the Settlement Price) – (Number of Futures Contracts 
Acquired * “Excess” Payments per futures contract)  
                                                 
28 Thus, DOE expert economist Bessembinder pointed out (statement at 9) that a scheme 
is more likely to be manipulation if it “causes other market participants to believe that 
supply-and-demand fundamentals support higher future prices.”  Here, because the 
trading is after hours, no other traders might be induced to reassess their beliefs about 
supply-and-demand fundamentals. 
  24    = $0.07N - $25. 
 
This number is greater than 0 if N>25/0.07=357.14.   
 
  Thus, a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for this event to have been 
manipulation was that Avista was more than 357 call option contracts long.
29  
Unfortunately, though this information would seem to have been easily available to DOE, 
it is not part of the record.  Given, however, that this was a “thin” market, as DOE 
pointed out, acquiring a long position of 357 options seems somewhat unlikely.  
 
  B.  Why Such a Low Price? 
 
  The manipulation theory implies that DiPlacido/Avista wanted a higher rather 
than a lower price.  This theory then leaves unanswered another question:  why was the 
price between McHugh and DiPlacido/Avista so low?  Surely, all else being equal, 
McHugh would have been willing to sell his PV futures contracts for a price above 
$58/MWH.  Given the manipulation theory (and assuming that Avista was more than 357 
options contracts net long), Avista would also have agreed to any higher price. 
 
  There are two available (and perhaps complementary) theories for this relatively 
low price.  First, recall that the parties involved are conducting an illegal transaction.  
Given this, what is the best price to select to reduce the chances of detection?  That price 
would clearly be the settlement price.  The more of an “outlier” a price is, the larger the 
probability that the illegal trading would be detected.  Thus, the change in price (by 
assumption nearer the settlement price) can be seen as an attempt to reduce the chance of 
detecting this illegal action. 
 
  Second, given that McHugh and Avista agreed to trade, what price would they 
have traded at?  Normally, such a trade would be taken to the floor, and the price would 
be determined competitively.  But by definition no such price is available in after-hours 
trading.  Given this, the settlement price is the only metric available of a “fair” price.  
Any conversations about the trading price between Kristufek and DiPlacido can therefore 
be seen as an attempt to discover the settlement price. 
 
  Both these theories are consistent with the observed events.  Neither is consistent 
with the manipulation theory, for any trades conducted at (or very close to) the (believed) 
settlement price will not change the settlement price in any economically important way. 
 
                                                 
29 In a similar calculation (statement at 38), defendant’s expert Kyle concluded that 
Avista would have had to be more than 354 call option contracts long.  Kyle and I appear 
to use slightly different assumptions about the settlement price, which results in the 
difference. 
  25  C. Why Was Only the Palo Verde Futures Contract Offer Accepted? 
 
  According to the DOE theory of this case, DiPlacido and Avista were attempting 
to manipulate both the COB and the PV markets on July 27.  McHugh offered to sell 
Avista/DiPlacido futures contracts in both markets.  Yet DiPlacido/Avista only accepted 
McHugh’s offer for PV futures contracts.  I am unable to explain why this would be 
consistent with manipulation theory. 
 
  A review of the tape transcripts, however, shows how this event is consistent with 
hedging theory.  (The transcript is from after-trading hours on July 27, Folder 13:01-
15:00, Folder 14, File 57.)  I begin at the point at which Kristufek learned that McHugh 
was offering contracts for sale after trading hours. 
 
Kristufek: Um. I I [sic] can buy 25 PALOs if he wants to put the spread 
on.  But I can’t buy 25 PALOs right now.  I over bought COB and you 
guys [apparently Livingstone and DiPlacido] under bought in PALO.  So, 
that’s the problem I’m havin’.  If he wants to put on a PALO-COB 
spread… 
 
Livingstone:  Hold on, hold on one second.  Here’s JADE [DiPlacido’s 
trade name]. 
 




DiPlacido: Can you help this guy out? 
 
Kristufek: I can help him out and I think I’m putting I’m doin’ him a favor 





Kristufek:  So, I can I buy 25 PALOs from him.  But you know, I think it’s 
a good spread to have on, if he’s ah if he’s long the COB and short the 
PALO. So. 
 
  I believe this indicates the following:  At the end of the trading period, Kristufek 
found that Avista had bought too many COB and too few PV contracts.  Indeed, the 
NYMEX Adjudication Committee decision (at 10) indicated that Kristufek was angry 
because DiPlacido had been unable to purchase the requested PV futures contracts.
30  
                                                 
30 The Defendant’s Appeals Brief (at 62) stated that DiPlacido had 68 unfilled PV orders 
at close.  I had the opportunity to listen to a recording of Kristufek’s comments after the 
PV close (Exhibit 14, Folder, 14, 100.WAV).  Kristufek stated: “I told you to bring me 
  26From a desire to “go flat” and hedge his position by “unwinding,” Kristufek responded to 
McHugh’s offer by making a proposal to buy PV-COB spreads from McHugh.  
(Livingstone, statement at paragraph 19, confirms Kristufek’s desire for a spread.)  This 
would have moved Avista toward a flat position.  McHugh, however, was long in both 
PV and COB.  (Thus, both McHugh and Avista were long in COB.)  Therefore, Avista 
agreed to purchase PV futures contracts from McHugh, hedging both their positions in 
PV while making no trades in COB. 
 
  This evidence indicates that the motivation for the after-hours trading by Avista 
was to hedge its position, and explains why Avista accepted McHugh’s offer of PV 
futures contracts, but not COB futures contracts.   
 
  In conclusion, in light of the after-hours trading of July 27, the manipulation 
theory has serious theoretical flaws.  In addition, it does not explain why the agreed-to 
price was so low and McHugh’s offer of COB futures contracts was not accepted, despite 
the fact that his offer of PV futures contracts was.  (Indeed, the manipulation theory does 
not explain why Kristufek wanted to sell COB futures contracts after buying them during 
the close.)  The evidence here is supportive, once again, of the hedging theory. 
 
IX. The Final Words? 
 
Much of the evidence in this case involved tape recordings.  As the careful reader 
will have already noted, traders in the heat of action on the floor will use their own jargon 
in excited tones. 
 
In reviewing these tapes, one should first realize that they are recordings of people 
under extreme business pressure.  Not surprisingly, they spend a good deal of their 
conversations engaged in various forms of braggadocio.  Thus, one should be aware of a 
tendency to exaggerate strategies and accomplishments.  This in turn means that it may 
not be appropriate to take such statements at face value.  As economists put it, much of 
what was discussed was “cheap talk.”
31 
 
Second, floor traders use their own “lingo” when describing relevant events.  
Given this, one should be very careful about reaching conclusions about particular 
statements.  This also means that alternative theories should be considered when 
evaluating these conversations.  Unfortunately, the CFTC placed much of its decision on 
potentially inflammatory statements by parties that actually have ambiguous meanings.  
                                                                                                                                                 
250 [PV] and I’m hoping you bought me at least 200.”  Kristufek is clearly very angry in 
the recording.  I was unable to find a transcript of this recording.  
31  The Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Dismiss (at 11) stated that 
the Chair of the NYMEX Appeals panel presented in oral argument a similar view of the 
information value of traders’ statements.  For similar arguments in an antitrust context, 
see A.A. Poultry Farms 881 F.2d 1396 (1989) (Easterbrook, J.) and Olympia Equipment, 
786 F.2d 794 (1986) (Posner, J.). 
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Basic economic theory teaches that if the demand for a product increases, the 
price of that product will rise.  Similarly, if there is an increase in the supply of the 
product, the price of that product will decline.  Thus, for example, market participants 
know that if they wish to buy a large amount of a relevant product, they will drive the 
price of that product up.  In the context of DiPlacido, it means that there is no economic 
difference between a statement urging that the price be driven up (to support 
manipulation) or that traders be willing to drive the price of the product up in order to 
buy the (large) quantity desired. 
 
For example, assume that a trader receives a large order to buy (or sell) as a 
market is closing.  Under hedging theory, with the options market expiring, the client 
needs to unwind its position in the underlying futures contract.  Further, because of its 
position, the client is less interested in the price of the trade than expected.  Under these 
circumstances, sell “at market worst,” or “don’t be shy” (slip. Op at 8) or “send prices to 
the moon” (slip. Op. at 11) by asking for an “ugly” closing price (slip. Op. at 11, 13), for 
example, is simply shorthand for “get rid of our position as fast as you can,” or “sell no 
matter what impact that has on price.” 
 
Such statements were at the core of much of the CFTC’s argument.  Of course, 
they are also consistent with manipulation theory.  My point is that these statements are 
nondispositive in determining which theory best deals with relevant events. 
 
  Left out of the CFTC decision was a piece of information that was seemingly 
crucial to the DOE position at trial.  Following up on the DOE brief, I had the 
opportunity to listen to the tape recording of the PV close on July 27 (Exhibit 104, Folder 
14, 152 WAV).  In this conversation, Kristufek was speaking on the telephone to 
DiPlacido, who was in the trading pit.  Kristufek was clearly agitated throughout the 
recording.  At one point he said, “I want it ugly,” referring to the settlement price.  He 
then stated, “I need 250 [contracts].  I need them.”  Then he stated: “I want it [the price] 
higher.”  Then Kristufek urged DiPlacido: “I need the f---ing lots.”  (Kristufek made this 
statement twice.) Then Kristufek stated: “I need the f---ers.” 
 
In the end, this is what this matter was all about.  Avista, DiPlacido’s client, was 
caught either short or long on various contracts and was trying to even out its position.  
Avista and DiPlacido’s conduct had nothing to do with manipulation.   
 
  28X.  Conclusion 
 
Market manipulation is a continuing threat to the efficiency of commodity 
markets.  The CFTC is designated as the expert agency in charge of protecting these 
markets.  As the expert agency in this area, the CFTC is charged with separating out 
manipulation (which destroys the effectiveness of markets) from hedging (which is the 
purpose of such markets).  Since 2001, the CFTC has carried out an active enforcement 
agenda against market manipulation.  Yet the events in DiPlacido raise serious questions 
about the efficacy of the CFTC’s actions.  In particular, the CFTC appears unable to 
differentiate between manipulative and hedging activity. 
  
  Unfortunately, rather than carefully analyzing the actions at issue in DiPlacido, as 
courts have told it to do, the CFTC first created a legal doctrine where one did not exist 
out of the 37-year-old hitherto obscure Henner case, quoted a variety of statements out of 
context, and ignored a great deal of evidence that supported the defendant’s position.  
Indeed, the great irony here is that the Judicial Examiner in Henner conducted exactly the 
type of inquiry the CFTC should have performed in DiPlacido. 
 
  In narrow terms, it is clear that DiPlacido should not have been found liable for 
market manipulation.  More broadly, this casts substantial doubt on whether the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission is up to the task of protecting the nation’s 
commodity markets from market manipulation without harming the ability of those 
markets to act as effective risk-hedging vehicles.  
 
  29